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NVIDIA (NVDA): The China Problem

We are short Nvidia (“NVDA”, “the Company”). We recognize the stakes. Nvidia holds the single largest market capitalization on the planet, while CEO Jensen Huang has been celebrated as a generationally talented operator. We share the consensus view that AI – for better or worse – will continue to transform society. This is not a bet against AI. We are short Nvidia for one reason: the Company has a significant China problem.

Summary of Culper Research Opinions

- Nvidia claims that its business in China went to “zero” after April 2025 U.S. trade restrictions. We believe that in reality, over 20% of Nvidia’s FY 2026 compute revenues remained driven by China – supported both by illegal GPU diversion and Southeast Asian intermediaries.
- Nvidia has repeatedly vouched for Megaspeed – its single largest Southeast Asian chip buyer currently under investigation by both U.S. Commerce and Singapore authorities – as “*wholly owned and operated by a company based and headquartered outside China, with no China shareholders.*” Nvidia has also claimed that it has “*repeatedly tested and sampled data centers around the world and found no diversion.*” Documents we uncovered, however, suggest that Megaspeed has been secretly financed by Alibaba via a series of apparent shell companies. Tellingly, Nvidia’s lawyered phrasing – that Megaspeed holds no Chinese *equity* – doesn’t seem to preclude Chinese *financing*.
- Megaspeed’s financial statements reveal that from year-end 2023 to year-end 2024, its balance sheet exploded from just \$33 million to \$3.0 billion in total liabilities and equity, driven almost entirely by \$2.9 billion in “*refundable deposits received*” from an un-named source. Megaspeed’s financials also show \$2.9 billion in “*amounts due from subsidiaries*” – money that it forwarded onto its operating subsidiaries such as Malaysia-based Speedmatrix.
- Malaysian filings reveal that in June 2024 – two months prior to commencing operations – Speedmatrix filed a charge in which it pledged *its entire business* as collateral to Apex Enterprise Solutions (Singapore). Singapore filings disclose that Apex’s corporate parent is Alibaba, and its sole purpose is stated as “*providing procurement activities.*” As of March 31, 2025 (latest available), Apex reported over \$4.1 billion in prepayments against \$4.2 billion in loans payable to Alibaba.
- Trade records reveal that from December 2024 through January 2026, Speedmatrix imported \$4.6 billion in product, of which \$4.0 billion originated from Aivres Systems Inc., an Nvidia Elite OEM compute partner that assembles high-end Nvidia-equipped servers.
- Aivres Systems was formerly known as Inspur Systems Inc., but rebranded after its parent, China-based Inspur Group, was placed on the U.S. entity list. Today, Aivres remains one-third owned by the Chinese state – just under 50% restriction thresholds. Aivres has also supplied servers via Indosat to Shanghai’s INF Tech, whose founder is a former Alibaba VP. In March 2026, the WSJ reported that Aivres would supply \$2.5 billion in Blackwell chips to a Malaysian operator who would lease the servers to ByteDance. Taken together, it seems to us that Aivres’ business remains, in effect, a China-dedicated supply channel.
- Just last month, Bain’s Bridge Data Centres (“BDC”) reportedly dropped Megaspeed as a tenant. BDC declined to cite why. One source we spoke with, however, suggested that BDC found that Megaspeed had been caught using the data center as “*a place for Megaspeed to install their dummy servers*” and “*divert the hardware.*”

- Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang has not only vouched for Megaspeed, but seems to have quite literally walked alongside Megaspeed at every step, while maintaining an uncomfortably close relationship with Megaspeed's Alice Huang, a Chinese national. He was first spotted partying with Alice Huang in June 2024 – the same month the Apex/Alibaba pledge was filed. He then dined with Alice Huang in Taiwan in May 2025 – just weeks after the news of U.S. trade restrictions. Finally, per one current Megaspeed employee, Jensen visits Megaspeed-linked data centers “*every few months*” and “*every single time*” he visits, he is accompanied by representatives from Alibaba. The Megaspeed employee characterized their relationship with Jensen as “*very close*”, corroborating another former Nvidia employee's suggestion to us that many Nvidia employees wondered if there was a special relationship. The same employee added that, in contrast to public reporting suggesting otherwise, Alice Huang is “*actually still our boss.*”
- In March 2026, the DoJ indicted three individuals tied to Supermicro Computer (SMCI), including co-founder Wally Liaw, for allegedly smuggling \$2.5 billion of Nvidia-powered servers into China via a Southeast Asian pass-through entity identified only as “Company-1.” Days ago, Bloomberg reported that “Company-1” is OBON Corp. (“OBON” i.e., “One Belt One Network”), a conclusion we agree with. We think there's far more to the story, however.
- We believe OBON is affiliated with Megaspeed, and that, in the words of one former high-level Nvidia employee we spoke with, “*Megaspeed is just the tip of the iceberg.*” The March 2026 indictment alleged \$2.5 billion in smuggling via a single corridor (Supermicro to OBON) – our research suggests this corridor is just one of many in what is a complex and far-flung operation involving multiple additional Nvidia OEMs, partners, and intermediaries.
- In October 2025, Nvidia partner YTL AI Cloud opened a \$4.3 billion data center in Johor, Malaysia, housing Blackwell-equipped servers. A current Megaspeed employee told us that Megaspeed is “*one of the most important customers*” for YTL, but that the parties conceal the relationship, saying, “*Megaspeed is able to get the supply of the GPUs and supply to the Chinese companies. They don't want the media attention so that it doesn't disrupt their business plans in the data centers.*”
- Nvidia Elite OEM partner Giga Computing has exported over \$500 million in H200 and Blackwell-equipped servers to Speedmatrix and to Novagate Cloud Bhd. Sdn. (“Novagate”). Novagate appears to be another Megaspeed offshoot – its website is nearly identical to Megaspeed's website, and one of its directors shares an address with Megaspeed's corporate headquarters. Novagate's Malaysian subsidiary was incorporated on April 11, 2025 – two days after trade restrictions were announced.
- Numerous experts told us that Nvidia has long possessed the means to detect diversion, including pre-sale signposts and standard KYC checks – e.g., recently-incorporated customers suddenly placing large orders and sales without warranties – as well as post-sale technical indicators – e.g., server IP data, mismatched server latency times, and servers “going dark” without explanation.
- Analysts treat China as potential upside. We believe it's the exact opposite. Nvidia's China business – which the Company told investors went to zero a year ago – is now *actually* going to zero as Beijing's late 2025 and early 2026 policies have, for example, blocked Nvidia imports in favor of its own domestic alternatives. Beijing's stance appears hardline. Our review of trade records suggests substantial declines in CY Q1 2026 shipments, while mainland operators tell us that there are now “*very few orders*” in China, presenting “*a huge blow to Nvidia financially.*” Nvidia now faces a massive air gap in this year's estimates. We think this also explains Jensen's recent behavior on the Dwarkesh Patel podcast, particularly when presented with questions surrounding China.

We are short Nvidia and think shares are headed lower.

“You have to look at the satellite network. You have Speedmatrix in Malaysia, where’s their infrastructure? Then you have to look at the shell companies. Then you have to look at how they buy. There are multiple countries and multiple entities involved. It’s a pretty complex operation. They just indicted 3 people, but there’s a lot of backstory... It’s found in the gap between what the Company says they’re doing and what they’re really doing... Megaspeed is just the tip of the iceberg.” – Former Nvidia Director-level Employee

“The China market brings in about 20% to 40% of revenues... They’ll [Nvidia] never disclose the numbers, of course, but it’s closer to 40%... Regardless of where they get the chips, it’s China at the end of the day. They just find ways around in order to do what they need to do... And remember, they’ve been doing this for years. The way the business works, and I know because I used to go to Singapore a lot, they have their own rules. They will just take the GPUs and say it’s a phone.” – Former Nvidia Employee

“Now that I work in Megaspeed, I know this company also has a very close relationship with Jensen... A representative from Alibaba would come within the same day or same week as Jensen. One would come in the morning and one in the evening. This is not once or twice; this is every single time. I assume they meet somewhere else before coming to our [data center].”
– Current Megaspeed Employee

“Megaspeed still has contract with YTL... Supermicro is getting the media attention [for] support[ing] Chinese companies, and we know that the U.S. has the restriction on chips, but Megaspeed is able to get the supply of the GPUs and supply to the Chinese companies. They don’t want the media attention so that it doesn’t disrupt their business plans...” – Current Megaspeed Employee

“Nvidia can triangulate a GPU’s location within a few dozen miles... if the heartbeat shows a latency more than 15 milliseconds past Singapore, then it’s being moved... So from an audit perspective, you can have a single number handshake. And if it doesn’t match the shipping invoice, you have proof of diversion.” – Former Nvidia Director-level Employee

“How could they have not known? ... There are ways of pinging the server through the internet to know, and surely Nvidia knows how to do that.” – Nvidia Channel Partner

“You [Nvidia] can tell because when you get the software updates, you send out the patch... They [Nvidia] know based on the IP address where the chip is at... they go back and see okay you bought 400 chips but now you’re only updating 300, so what happened to the other 100?”
– Former Supermicro Manager

“If we look at the market share going from 90% [in China] to 55% [in 2025] and if it goes to zero, it will be a huge blow to Nvidia financially.” – Former Nvidia Employee in Shenzhen

“As you will see this year, there are very few orders in China... Nvidia market share in China will decline this year. That’s why Jensen Huang was in panic mode and went to China and all that.” – Chinese Tech Executive

Introduction: Nvidia Claims “We Are 100% Out of China” Yet We Believe China Drove a Significant Portion of FY 2026 Compute Revenues

In April 2025, the U.S. tightened restrictions so as to effectively ban *all* Nvidia GPU sales to China, including sales to “*companies headquartered or with an ultimate parent therein.*”¹ Nvidia took a \$5.5 billion [write-down](#) on its H20 chip inventory and disclosed that export controls would lead to a loss of “*approximately \$8 billion*” in anticipated H20 revenues for FY Q2 2026. Since that time, Nvidia has claimed to hold zero compute share in China. For example in October 2025, [speaking](#) at a Citadel Securities conference, CEO Huang stated of its compute business that, “*at the moment, we are 100% out of China... we went from 95% market share to 0%.*”² Similarly in an [interview](#) just days ago, Jensen again [claimed](#) that, “*in China, we have now dropped to zero.*”³

Even more so, CEO Huang has repeatedly claimed to find zero evidence of any chip diversion to China. Speaking to Bloomberg in May 2025, he [claimed](#), “***There’s no evidence of any AI chip diversion. These are massive systems. The Grace Blackwell system is nearly two tons, and so you’re not going to be putting that in your pocket or your backpack anytime soon.***”

In a November 2025 Bloomberg [interview](#), Huang again claimed, “*Of course, over the years, people have speculated about diversion. We’ve chased down every single concern. And we’ve repeatedly tested and sampled data centers around the world and found no diversion.*”



Source: [Bloomberg](#)

¹ Since October 2022, the U.S. BIS has placed sweeping export controls on Nvidia GPU sales to China, including the A100, H100, H200, and Blackwell series. Ahead of the 2022 restrictions, Nvidia engineered the H20 to perform just below BIS restriction thresholds.

² In FY 2026, the Company reported \$19.7 billion in China revenues, which is explained by multiple factors outside of the SE Asian and smuggling routes we describe here, including both export controls taking effect partway through the fiscal year, and Nvidia’s non-data center compute business (i.e., gaming, networking, auto, etc.) in China.

³ For example, on the Company’s May 2025 earnings call, CEO Huang stated, “*Today, however, the \$50 billion China market is effectively closed to U.S. industry.*” Per CFO Kress on the same call, “*our outlook reflects a loss in H20 revenue of approximately \$8 billion for the second quarter.*” According to CEO Huang at the June 2025 meeting, “*We went from a \$30 billion, \$40 billion a year business to zero.*”

We believe that despite essentially no *direct* compute sales into China after April 2025, Nvidia continued to service Chinese demand via sales to non-restricted intermediaries and diversion.

Indeed, Jensen has mocked the very notion of diversion as physically impossible, only for the March 2026 Supermicro indictment to detail a staggering \$2.5 billion diverted through a *single* OEM/pass-through relationship.⁴ Investors today, however, still hold blind faith in Jensen when he claims that Nvidia's China compute business went to zero – suggesting that improved trade relations unlocks upside for Nvidia. That blind faith is misplaced.

Historically, analysts have recognized that Nvidia's pre-restriction China exposure was meaningful. For example, in mid-2025, DA Davidson analyst Gil Luria estimated [that](#) “at least 25%” of Nvidia chips [and](#) “as much as 40%” of revenues ultimately reflect Chinese demand. In March 2026, Wells Fargo flagged that “*NVDA has previously noted that China accounted for 20-25% of total Data Center revenue.*”

One former Nvidia Director-level employee we spoke with estimated that “20% to 40%” of Nvidia's data center business remained functionally Chinese even after the April 2025 restrictions took effect – **China didn't go to zero; it just took a new shape.**⁵

On intermediaries: “*The reality is that China is still just using it... Even if the servers don't go to China, they go somewhere in Europe or Southeast Asia, and they just rent to China, and at the end of the day, Nvidia still wins.*”

On smuggling: “*We send these racks to Singapore – that's the most common one. A lot of these companies they incorporate there. They don't say they're Nvidia servers, they just say that it's IT equipment.*”

On Nvidia's continued exposure: “*The China market brings in about 20% to 40% of revenues... They'll never disclose the numbers, of course, but it's closer to 40%. And remember, they've been doing this for years. The way the business works – and I know because I used to go to Singapore a lot – they have their own rules. They will just take the GPUs and say it's a phone. Sure, you can put the auditors, but we don't have enough police in the world to police it.*”

Nvidia's Revenue Reporting Disguises the True Extent of its Reliance on China

Nvidia reports revenues based upon customers' headquarters location, and its customers are OEMs and channel partners – not the actual GPU end users. As such, investors have had little visibility into how reliant the Company has *remained* on China after U.S. export controls took effect.⁶

For example, Nvidia OEM partner Aivres Systems, Inc. (“Aivres”) is ostensibly based in California, but our review of trade records reveal that Aivres has shipped over \$4 billion to Megasppeed and its Malaysian subsidiary, Speedmatrix. Nvidia would report these as U.S. sales, even if the GPUs were ultimately meant for Chinese end use.

⁴ Numerous additional smaller-scale diversion cases have been both suspected and prosecuted, as [profiled](#) for example by Epoch AI, which estimated that between 290,000 to 1.6 million H100-equivalent chips were smuggled to China in 2025.

⁵ These views are corroborated by multiple third-party data sources, as we detail later in this report.

⁶ In FY Q3 2026 (October 2025), Nvidia changed its geographic revenue reporting methodology from customers *billing* location to customers *headquarters* location – eliminating the entirety of what the Company previously reported as Singapore-based revenues. The timing of the change is conspicuous. Singapore had grown from just 8.5% of revenues in FY 2023 to 20.1% for the LTM ended July 2025. At the time, Singapore also faced considerable scrutiny from regulators and journalists for its potential role in aiding Chinese diversion and circumvention. Nvidia has maintained that “over 99%” of its reported Singapore revenues are tied to U.S. end customers, that the Singapore billing merely reflects U.S. customers “centralized billing practices”, and “we believe changing to revenue based upon the location of our customers' headquarters provides a better representation of the geographic profile of our revenue.”

In what follows, we document, from the bottom-up, multiple billions of dollars in Nvidia-powered servers that have flowed in service of China throughout 2025 via multiple Nvidia partners and OEMs, and how Jensen has appeared to walk alongside the Chinese every step of the way.

Supermicro, OBON Corp, Siam AI, and Megaspeed – “The Tip of the Iceberg”

In March 2026, the DoJ charged three individuals tied to Supermicro Computer (SMCI) with conspiring to smuggle at least \$2.5 billion in NVDA chips to China between 2024 and 2025. The indictment describes the individual as utilizing a Southeast Asian pass-through entity – identified only as “Company-1” – to give *“the appearance of legitimate commercial activity and to obscure their China-based end customers.”* According to the indictment, a key component of this scheme was the defendants’ use of staged “dummy” servers, where the real servers had already been diverted to China.

3. The defendants and their co-conspirators took extensive measures to conceal their scheme. For example, to deceive the U.S. Manufacturer’s compliance team, which was responsible for conducting audits of Company-1’s purchases of servers to ensure adherence to U.S. export control laws, the defendants staged “dummy” servers—non-working, physical replicas of the U.S. Manufacturer’s servers—for inspection at the locations where Company-1 was purportedly storing the servers it had purchased from the U.S. Manufacturer. However, the actual servers from the U.S. Manufacturer had already been unlawfully shipped to China. When questions were raised

Source: [March 2026 Indictment](#)

Nvidia investors shrugged off [the indictment](#) – \$2.5 billion smuggled over two years appears inconsequential. We think this is a mistake. Bloomberg has since [reported](#) that “Company-1” – the previously unnamed Southeast Asian intermediary – is Thailand-based OBON Corp. We agree with Bloomberg’s conclusion, but believe there is far more to the story.

We believe OBON Corp is affiliated with Megaspeed – reportedly Nvidia’s single largest chip buyer in Southeast Asia. In our view, the March 2026 indictment exposed not only \$2.5 billion in alleged smuggling via the Supermicro / OBON corridor, but our research suggests this corridor is just one of many in what is a complex and far-flung operation involving multiple additional Nvidia OEMs, partners, and intermediaries.

OBON and Siam.AI Appear to be Affiliated with Megaspeed International

We believe that Siam AI and OBON are affiliated with Singapore-based Megaspeed International Pte. Ltd. – reportedly Nvidia’s largest chip buyer in Southeast Asia.

To begin, Siam AI’s website bears an eerily similar resemblance to Megaspeed’s website, as shown below. As we detail later in this report, we also see the same pattern with another entity we believe to be affiliated with Megaspeed – Novagate Cloud – which only bolsters our view.



Source: Megaspeed



Source: Siam AI

Easily deploy and manage Virtual Servers at scale

OUR VIRTUAL SERVERS ARE BUILT ON TOP OF KUBERNETES, USING THE OPEN-SOURCE PROJECT KUBEVIRT FOR WORKLOADS THAT AREN'T EASILY CONTAINERIZED, LAUNCH VIRTUAL SERVERS IN SECONDS FROM THE UI OR VIA THE MEGASPEED.AI KUBERNETES API.

- Optimized for best-in-class performance**
Leverage the bare-metal performance of dedicated GPUs via PCI pass-through. No GPU virtualization or shared resources.
- Ultimate flexibility in compute and hardware configurations**
Like everything in Megaspeed.AI, virtual servers are customizable. Match the complexity of your workloads with a wide range of NVIDIA GPUs, and switch between types in a matter of seconds.
- Full support for both Linux and Windows Virtual Servers**
Both NVIDIA GPU accelerated and CPU-only Virtual Servers are available with pre-built Linux Distributions or Windows versions. Need something else? Bring your own ISO.

Source: Megaspeed

Effortlessly scale up deployment and management of Virtual Servers.

Our Virtual Servers are powered by Kubernetes to handle workloads that aren't easily containerized. Additionally, we integrate Slurm for efficient resource management and workload scheduling, ensuring optimal performance and scalability. You can launch Virtual Servers in seconds directly from our user interface.

- Fine-tuned for top-notch performance.**
Harness the raw power of dedicated GPUs through PCI pass-through for bare-metal performance, free from GPU virtualization or shared resources.
- Experience unparalleled flexibility in both compute and hardware configurations.**
Customize your virtual servers to suit your needs. Utilize a diverse range of NVIDIA GPUs to align with the complexity of your workloads, and seamlessly switch between GPU types within seconds.
- Our platform provides comprehensive support for both Linux and Windows Virtual Servers.**
Choose from our selection of Virtual Servers, including those with NVIDIA GPU acceleration or CPU-only options, all pre-configured with either Linux distributions or Windows versions. If you require a different setup, you can also bring your own ISO.

Source: Siam AI

Further, Megaspeed’s website once named Supermicro as a partner alongside Nvidia, Intel, and Gigabyte, but has since scrubbed all references to Supermicro. As shown, however, we uncovered traces of Supermicro’s previous mention evident in Megaspeed’s website source code.

```

<div class="intro-item">
  <div class="intro-item-name">Gigabyte</div>
  <div class="intro-item-desc">
    <a href="https://www.gigabyte.com/Enterprise" target="_blank">
      
    </a>
  </div>
</div>
<!-- <div class="intro-item">
  <div class="intro-item-name">supermicro</div>
  <div class="intro-item-desc">
    
  </div>
</div -->
</div>
</div>

```

Source: [Megaspeed Website Code](#)

Finally, Bloomberg reporting [suggested](#) that one of OBON's "multiple end customers" was Alibaba, a notion that appears internally emphasized by Bloomberg's sources. As detailed later in this report, our research suggests that Megaspeed not only counts Alibaba as a key end customer, but that has also been financed by Alibaba.

Nvidia Has Repeatedly Vouched for Megaspeed – Its Single Largest Southeast Asian Chip Buyer – Amid Multiple Ongoing Investigations

Megaspeed International Pte. Ltd. [presents itself](#) as a Singapore-based "AI computing power cloud service provider" and "a core business partner of Nvidia's computing power cloud business in the Asia-Pacific region." In plain terms, Megaspeed claims to be a neocloud – it purchases Nvidia-powered servers, installs them in data centers in Southeast Asia, and rents the capacity out to end users.

Megaspeed has faced considerable scrutiny from both journalists and government officials who have raised serious questions surrounding its ownership structure, the scale of its chip purchases relative to its data center footprint, its ties to China's Yangtze River Delta mega-project, and its potential role in "helping companies in China sidestep American export restrictions" on Nvidia GPUs.⁷ Megaspeed reportedly remains under investigation by both U.S. Commerce and Singapore officials.

In response to these concerns, however, **Nvidia has repeatedly and publicly vouched for Megaspeed**, making in effect two key claims: Megaspeed is not *owned* by the Chinese, and it is not smuggling chips.

- In October 2025, Nvidia spokesperson John Rizzo told the NYT that Nvidia had "engaged with the U.S. government" regarding Megaspeed, that Nvidia visited Megaspeed's facilities and found "no evidence of diversion" and that Nvidia concluded that Megaspeed was "wholly owned and operated by a company based and headquartered outside China, with no China shareholders." Note the specificity of Rizzo's final claim, which pertains to Megaspeed's *equity ownership*, but says nothing as to how Megaspeed may have been financed, or how it financed its server purchases.
- In November 2025, Nvidia CEO Huang publicly [claimed](#) that Nvidia had, "repeatedly tested and sampled data centers around the world and found no diversion."
- In December 2025, an Nvidia spokesperson maintained that Megaspeed has done "nothing untoward" as the Company's "spot checks" on customers in the region – in which Nvidia catalogued "some 86,000 GPUs" – confirmed that the GPUs "are where they are supposed to be."

In our view, Nvidia's assurances can no longer be trusted.

Documents We Uncovered Suggest That Alibaba Has Secretly Financed Megaspeed's Malaysian Subsidiary, Speedmatrix

⁷ According to December 2025 [Bloomberg](#) reporting, "a review of hundreds of pages of trade records, corporate filings, job postings and private documents from Megaspeed and its partners — plus interviews with dozens of people across six countries, including US and foreign government and industry officials, as well as technical experts such as SemiAnalysis — revealed inconsistencies in Megaspeed's Southeast Asia chip inventory and overall data center footprint. All of the people interviewed requested anonymity to be able to discuss sensitive information. According to [the New York Times](#), both U.S. Commerce and Singapore officials have been investigating Megaspeed's potential role in "helping companies in China sidestep American export restrictions, according to more than a half dozen current and former officials and other people familiar with the companies..."

Our research – including extensive analysis of trade records, corporate filings in both Singapore and Malaysia, and conversations with Nvidia partners – suggests that Speedmatrix, Megaspeed’s key Malaysian operating subsidiary, was effectively financed by Alibaba.

In March 2023, Megaspeed was spun out of 7Road – a Chinese gaming and cloud computing company with [documented ties](#) to Chinese state-backed investors. Megaspeed is now 100% owned by Swiftdata Pte. Ltd., which was formed on October 31, 2023. Megaspeed became an Nvidia partner just two weeks later.

1. Corporate information

Megaspeed International Pte. Ltd., (the “Company”) is a limited liability company incorporated and domiciled in Singapore. The registered office and principal place of business of the Company is located at 2 Venture Drive #24-01 Vision Exchange Singapore 608526.

The principal activity of the Company is that of information technology consultancy (except cybersecurity).

The immediate and ultimate holding company is Swiftdata Pte. Ltd., which is incorporated in Singapore.

Source: Singapore Filings



Source: [Megaspeed](#)

Megaspeed’s financial statements reveal that the company had relatively few assets at year-end 2023, but that its balance sheet exploded by the end of 2024, driven almost entirely by \$2.9 billion in “other receivables” offset by \$2.9 billion in “other payables.”

Megaspeed International Pte. Ltd.			
Statement of Financial Position As at 31 December 2024			
	Note	2024 USD	2023 USD
ASSETS			
Non-current assets			
Plant and equipment	8	42,301	–
Other receivables	9	215,956	17,040,482
Investment in subsidiaries	10	5,539,221	–
Total non-current assets		5,797,478	17,040,482
Current assets			
Prepayments		5,002,245	–
Trade receivables	11	76,832,219	117,185
Other receivables	9	2,886,115,883	10,000,000
Cash and cash equivalents	12	1,917,377	5,735,024
Total current assets		2,969,867,724	15,852,209
Total assets		2,975,665,202	32,892,691
LIABILITIES			
Current liabilities			
Trade payables	13	40,633,756	1,796,397
Other payables	14	2,945,111,563	21,137,771
Total current liabilities		2,985,745,319	22,934,168
Total liabilities		2,985,745,319	22,934,168
EQUITY			
Share capital	15	10,000,000	10,000,000
Retained profits/(accumulated losses)		(20,081,049)	(41,477)
Other comprehensive income		932	–
Total equity		(10,080,117)	9,958,523
Total equity and liabilities		2,975,665,202	32,892,691

Source: Singapore Filings

In turn, Megaspeed’s notes to the financial statements disclose that other payables consist almost entirely of “refundable deposits received” and other receivables consist almost entirely of “amounts due from subsidiaries.”

9. Other receivables		
	2024	2023
	USD	USD
Non-current		
Deposits	215,957	17,040,482
Current		
Loan receivable	7,656,742	10,000,000
Amount due from subsidiaries	2,878,457,242	–
	2,886,329,941	10,000,000

14. Other payables		
	2024	2023
	USD	USD
Refundable deposits received	2,686,498,391	20,117,185
Accrued operating expenses	35,260	1,020,586
Amount due to subsidiaries	87,019,942	–
	2,945,111,963	21,137,771

Source: Singapore Filings

In plain terms, it appears that Megaspeed was spun out of 7Road with very little to its name. Then, sometime in 2024, Megaspeed obtained \$2.9 billion in someone else's money, which it then passed through to its operating subsidiaries such as Speedmatrix, which, as we will show – use that money to purchase Nvidia-powered servers. Multiple elements of this structure raise alarm bells, in our view.

First, Megaspeed went from very little business to billions in a rapid time frame. This is the exact sort of pattern that experts told us *ought to* raise alarm bells at Nvidia as indicative of diversion or circumvention activity.⁸

“The first is the pre-sale – where the orders don't match the profile. So if someone suddenly orders billions, it triggers the flag.”

– Former Nvidia Employee

“If you can show hey, they weren't just incorporated last week, they've been in business for years, then they can make that sale, recognize that revenue and so on... some of these others that were selling to these companies that were two weeks old – you've got to be scratching your head there.”

– Former Supermicro Employee

Second, the deposits are classified as *refundable*, suggesting that the counterparty retains an economic claim. Third, Megaspeed does *not* disclose the deposits as owed back to its parent company, Swiftdata.⁹ In fact, nowhere in the annual report does Megaspeed disclose where it obtained the \$2.9 billion in cash.

Megaspeed's Speedmatrix subsidiary may provide a helpful clue, however.

⁸ This pattern is not unique to Megaspeed, as we show with respect to another buyer of Nvidia Blackwell-powered servers, Novagate Cloud, later in this report.

⁹ Elsewhere, Megaspeed *does* disclose related party transactions, including with subsidiaries, as such.

Megaspeed operates in Malaysia via its wholly owned subsidiary, Speedmatrix Sdn. Bhd., which was formed in February 2024.

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF A COMPANY	
PARTICULARS OF COMPANY	
Proposed name	SPEEDMATRIX SDN. BHD.
Lodging Reference No	PAC020220245874336
Purpose	N - NEW INCORPORATION
Company Type	S - LIMITED BY SHARES
Sub Type	SDN. BHD.
Incorporation Date	07/02/2024

Source: [Malaysian Corporate Filings](#)

In June 2024, several meaningful events took place.

First, Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang met with Megaspeed's Alice Huang, or Huang Le, at a Taipei party. According to NYT reporting, *"She said, 'I bet you guys I can get Jensen here,' and then Jensen immediately showed up."*

Reporting from Bloomberg and the New York Times suggested that Megaspeed's Alice Huang had departed the Company, but our research suggests otherwise. According to a current Megaspeed employee we spoke with,

"Alice Huang is actually still our boss. The media says she is not, but this is not true. She has gone quiet for the past 2 or 3 months, she has gone into the background. That's just what the media says. But recently she has come back and is involved at the administrative level and daily operations. It is very chaotic – this has changed. Our priorities have changed as well. Even though in the media it says that she is no longer the director. But she is still our director, in fact she is one of the top 3 in the company. A lot of the outsiders don't know this, and she doesn't make any statements to the media."

Second, Speedmatrix began receiving massive shipments of Nvidia-powered servers, according to the New York Times. Our own review of trade data also suggested that Speedmatrix received zero shipments prior to June 2024.

Nearly \$2 Billion in A.I. Equipment

Speedmatrix received more than 200 shipments between June 2024 and June 2025 of restricted Nvidia technology, which is barred from being sent to China.

Date 2024-06-27			
Exporter AIVRES SYSTEMS INC		Importer SPEEDMATRIX SDN BHD	
Exporter Address 615 N KING RD, SAN JOSE, CA 95133 UNITED STATES UNITED STATES		Importer Address 19B, JALAN TAPAH, OFF JALAN GOH HOCK HUAT, 41400 KLANG, SELANGOR MALAYSIA	
HS Code 8471809000			
Product KAYTUS HJBOGMODEL : SA6688-B7-A0-FO-LO (H800 80G MODULES*1/3.84TB NVM)			
Country of Origin UNITED STATES		Country of Destination MALAYSIA	
Port of Loading LOS ANGELES - CA		Port of Discharge KUALA LUMPUR	
Weight 9297.5	Wgt Unit KG	Quantity 120	Qty Unit UNT
House B/L W20202410610613		Master B/L	Data Type B/L
Transport Mode AIR		Value (US\$) 25416423	

In this June 2024 shipment from Aivres, Speedmatrix imported \$25.4 million worth of servers containing **Nvidia H800 chips**.

Source: ImportGenius By The New York Times

Shortly after Ms. Huang reached out, Mr. Huang arrived in his trademark black leather jacket and drank a whiskey shot with the group. He was accompanied by two other Nvidia executives and had planned to attend the party, said a person close to the company.



Nvidia's chief executive, Jensen Huang, with Megaspeed's executive, Alice Huang, at a party in Taipei in June 2024. The company NetThunder posted this photo on LinkedIn.

Source: [New York Times](#)

Third, Speedmatrix, in its Malaysian corporate filings, filed a charge – a specific debenture over its assets – including present and future IT and network equipment, intellectual property, related documents, and insurances.

To the Registrar of Companies,

1. The charge is created by:	SPEEDMATRIX SDN. BHD.
2. The charge was created on:	18 JUNE 2024
3. The charge is:	FIXED
4. The description of the instrument(s) creating or evidencing the charge:	A SPECIFIC DEBENTURE DATED 18 JUNE 2024.
5. Describe briefly the nature of liability (present or prospective) secured by the charge:	COLLECTIVELY, ALL LIABILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS AT ANY TIME DUE, OWING OR INCURRED BY THE OBLIGORS TO APEX ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS (SINGAPORE) PRIVATE LIMITED (COMPANY NO. 202328612H) ("APEX") ARISING UNDER THE TRANSACTION DOCUMENTS AND/OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE ADVANCE (EXCLUDING THOSE LIABILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH THE PREPAYMENT OF SERVICE FEES MADE UPON THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS IN THE SERVICE AGREEMENT, ON OR PRIOR TO THE EXECUTION OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT), WHETHER THE DEBTS OR LIABILITIES ARE: (A) PRESENT OR FUTURE\ (B) ACTUAL, PROSPECTIVE, CONTINGENT OR OTHERWISE\ OR (C) OWED OR INCURRED, SOLELY OR JOINTLY, AS PRINCIPAL OR SURETY OR IN ANY OTHER CAPACITY\ OR (D) OWED OR INCURRED AS PRINCIPAL, INTEREST, REFUND, FEES, CHARGES, PURCHASE PRICE, TAXES, DUTIES, DAMAGES WHETHER FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT OR TORT OR INCURRED ON ANY OTHER GROUND, LOSSES, COSTS, EXPENSES OR ON ANY OTHER ACCOUNT. CAPITALISED TERMS USED BUT NOT OTHERWISE DEFINED HEREIN SHALL HAVE THE MEANING GIVEN TO THEM IN THE SPECIFIC DEBENTURE.
6. The liability secured is for the benefit of the company or for another party (name and address of another party):	SPEEDMATRIX SDN. BHD.
7. The creation of subsequent charges *is / *is not restricted or prohibited:	Is Restricted or Prohibited
8. A short description of the property affected:	
PROPERTY DETAILS	
(A) BY WAY OF FIRST FIXED CHARGE, ALL ITS PRESENT AND FUTURE RIGHTS, TITLE AND INTEREST IN AND TO (A) THE EQUIPMENT; (B) THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY; (C) THE DOCUMENTS; AND (D) THE INSURANCES, TO THE EXTENT NOT VALIDLY AND EFFECTIVELY ASSIGNED UNDER CLAUSE 4.2 (ASSIGNMENT) OF THE SPECIFIC DEBENTURE. (B) BY WAY OF FIRST LEGAL ASSIGNMENT, (A) ALL ITS PRESENT AND FUTURE RIGHTS, TITLE, BENEFITS AND INTERESTS IN AND TO THE INSURANCES; (B) ALL ITS PRESENT AND FUTURE RIGHTS, TITLE, BENEFITS AND INTERESTS IN AND TO THE DOCUMENTS; (C) ALL RELATED RIGHTS; AND (D)	

Source: Speedmatrix Malaysia Filings, Statement of Charges Filed June 18, 2024¹⁰

Speedmatrix's annual report states it commenced business operations two months *after* these charges were filed.

COMMENCEMENT OF BUSINESS

The Company was incorporated on 7 February 2024 and commenced its business operations on 20 August 2024.

Source: Malaysia Filings, Annual Report for year-end December 31, 2024

¹⁰ Photo has been abbreviated for the sake of brevity.

The chargee – i.e., the entity with the claim on Speedmatrix’s assets – is named as Apex Enterprise Solutions (Singapore) Private Limited (“Apex”).

9. The name and address of the chargee:

CHARGE TYPE	NAME	IDENTIFICATION NO/ REGISTRATION NO	ADDRESS
Others	APEX ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS (SINGAPORE) PRIVATE LIMITED		51 BRAS BASAH ROAD #03-06 LAZADA ONE SINGAPORE 189554 , SINGAPORE

Source: Speedmatrix Malaysia Filings, Statement of Charges Filed June 18, 2024

Singapore corporate filings reveal, in turn, that Apex’s corporate parent is Alibaba Group, and its sole stated purpose is “providing procurement activities.”

APEX ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS (SINGAPORE) PRIVATE LIMITED

NOTES TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

For the financial year ended March 2025

1 General information

The Company is a private company limited by shares incorporated and domiciled in Singapore. The address of its registered office is 51 Bras Basah Road #03-06, Lazada One, Singapore 189554. **The Company is providing procurement activities for the financial year ended 31 March 2025.**

The Company’s immediate holding company is Cloud Intelligence (Cayman) Holding Limited, a company incorporated in Cayman Islands. The Company’s ultimate holding company is Alibaba Group Holding Limited (“Alibaba Group”), a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands.

These financial statements have been approved for issue by the board of director on 18 March 2026.

These financial statements are presented in United States Dollar (“US\$”), unless otherwise stated.

Source: Singapore Filings

As of its March 31, 2025 balance sheet, Apex recorded over \$4.1 billion in “prepayment and other receivables”, representing the vast majority of its total assets. In turn, Apex held \$4.2 billion in “loans payable to related companies” i.e., its parent, Alibaba. Each of these accounts skyrocketed over 10x their 2024 levels.

In other words, it looks to us like Alibaba fronted \$4.2 billion to a Singapore shell, which may have given a large portion of that money to Megaspeed, which then distributed that money to Speedmatrix and its other subsidiaries in order to fund the purchases of Nvidia-powered servers.

APEX ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS (SINGAPORE) PRIVATE LIMITED				
BALANCE SHEET				
As at 31 March 2025				
	Note	2025	2024	
		US\$	US\$	
ASSETS				
Non-current assets				
Deferred tax assets	13	5,675,671	-	
		⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗	⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗	
		⊗⊗	⊗⊗	
Total non-current assets		5,675,671	-	
		⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗	⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗	
		⊗⊗	⊗⊗	
Current assets				
Cash and cash equivalents	11	28,288,807	13,199,537	
Prepayment and other receivables	12	4,152,474,667	386,838,006	
Amount due from immediate holding company	15(b)	1	1	
Amount due from related companies	15(b)	388,043,595	-	
		⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗	⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗	
		⊗⊗	⊗⊗	
Total current assets		4,568,807,070	400,037,544	
		⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗	⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗	
		⊗⊗	⊗⊗	
Total assets		4,574,482,741	400,037,544	
LIABILITIES				
Current liabilities				
Loan payable to related companies	15(c)	4,219,703,536	400,301,667	
Income tax payable		7,052,087	-	
Trade and other payables	14	341,006,966	11,569	
		⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗	⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗	
		⊗⊗	⊗⊗	
Total liabilities		4,567,762,589	400,313,236	
		⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗	⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗⊗	
		⊗⊗	⊗⊗	
Total equity and liabilities		4,574,482,741	400,037,544	

Source: Apex Annual Report for YE March 31, 2025, filed in Singapore

Recall that Nvidia previously claimed to find that Megaspeed was “wholly owned and operated by a company based and headquartered outside China, with no China shareholders.” We applaud Nvidia for the precise phrasing – surely the handiwork of a team of overpaid lawyers – but note that the Company’s assurances *don’t* preclude the possibility that Megaspeed is simply being *financed* by China, even if its *equity* ownership isn’t Chinese.

The fun doesn’t end there. Apex’s financial statements *also* disclose that subsequent to March 31, 2025, the Company made *additional* payments of more than \$4.2 billion “for services to be performed.”¹¹

¹¹ As shown, Apex also repaid \$1 billion to Alibaba and received additional loans of over \$1 billion from two related (i.e., Alibaba) companies.

APEX ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS (SINGAPORE) PRIVATE LIMITED**NOTES TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS****For the financial year ended 31 March 2025****16 Subsequent events**

Subsequent to 31 March 2025 and up to the issuance date of the financial statements, the Company has made additional payments more than US\$ 4,208,000,000 for services to be performed.

Subsequent to 31 March 2025, the Company has repaid all of its loan payable to its related company, Cloud Intelligence (Singapore) Holding Private Limited including interest payable for a total amount of US\$ 1,006,000,000.

Subsequent to 31 March 2025, the Company have received additional loans payable from its related companies, Alibaba Southeast Asia Holding Limited and Clawcloud (Singapore) Private Limited amounting to US\$ 548,000,000 and US\$ 513,000,000 respectively.

Source: Apex Annual Report for YE March 31, 2025, filed in Singapore

We suspect this money poured more or less directly into Speedmatrix/Megaspeed coffers and likely towards Nvidia-powered server purchases.

Recall that as of year-end 2024, Megaspeed's Singapore entity recorded \$2.9 billion in receivables due from subsidiaries.

Speedmatrix's financial statements filed in Malaysia reveal that at year-end 2024, it owed 7.9 billion RM – or ~\$1.6 billion USD at then-prevailing rates – to its immediate holding company, i.e., Megaspeed.

CURRENT LIABILITIES		
Trade payables	18	718,108,995
Other payables and accruals	19	13,377,608
Amount owing to immediate holding company	10	7,904,421,257
Lease liabilities	17	89,535,487
		<u>8,725,443,437</u>
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES		<u>8,863,063,648</u>

Source: Speedmatrix 2024 annual report

In 2024, Speedmatrix added 8.5 billion RM – or ~\$1.9 billion USD – in PP&E, the vast majority of which is disclosed as server equipment.

Registration No. 202401005674 (1551524-M)

SPEEDMATRIX SDN. BHD.
(Incorporated in Malaysia)

6. **PROPERTY, PLANT AND EQUIPMENT**

	Balance at 07.02.2024	Addition	Cost Translation differences	Balance at 31.12.2024
	RM	RM	RM	RM
Capital work in progress	-	1,866,878,547	(28,668,762)	1,838,209,785
Computer and office equipment	-	151,763	(2,331)	149,432
Data center furniture and fittings	-	53,974,751	(828,864)	53,145,887
Server equipment	-	6,610,275,557	(101,510,843)	6,508,764,714
Renovation	-	161,640	(2,482)	159,158
	-	8,531,442,258	(131,013,282)	8,400,428,976


Source: Speedmatrix 2024 annual report

Although Megaspeed and Speedmatrix's 2024 financial statements are the latest available, we believe the scale of this operation has ballooned over time, especially amid tightening U.S. trade restrictions.

Speedmatrix Sourced Over \$4 Billion in Servers Via Nvidia Partner Aivres – A De Facto China-Dedicated Channel Partially Owned by the Chinese State


Reporters at the New York Times previously that Speedmatrix imported “nearly \$2 billion” in servers from June 2024 to June 2025. Our review of trade data, however, suggests the true number is far greater. **From December 2024 through January 2026, Speedmatrix imported \$4.6 billion** of product.

Speedmatrix Sdn Bhd Imports (\$ millions)



Source: Tradesparq

Of this total, \$4.0 billion originated from Aivres Systems, Inc., an Nvidia Elite OEM compute partner based in California. Aivres was formerly known as Inspur Systems Inc. and in May 2023 rebranded to Aivres after its parent company, China-based Inspur Group, was [placed](#) on the U.S. entity list, effectively blacklisting it in the U.S.¹² Today, Aivres is wholly owned by Inspur Electronic, which is one-third owned by its Chinese parent, Inspur Group, according to both WSJ [reporting](#) and [Chinese outlets](#). As such, Aivres technically falls outside of both Nvidia trade restrictions and the broader entity list restrictions, which kick in at 50% ownership.




¹² In March 2025, the U.S. [blacklisted](#) several additional Inspur subsidiaries. In September 2025, the BIS [issued](#) an interim final rule such that “any entity that is at least 50 percent owned by one or more entities on the Entity List will itself automatically be subject to Entity List restrictions.” On November 10, 2025, the rule was suspended for one year.

Source: [Nvidia Partners](#)

Trade data reveals that from March to November 2025, Aivres exported a total of \$4.2 billion in product, including \$1.3 billion shipped after April 2025. Of this \$4.2 billion total, \$4 billion was sent to Speedmatrix.¹³

Aivres Systems: Exports (\$ millions)



Source: [Tradesparq](#)

Previous reporting from the WSJ [traced](#) how Aivres supplied “about \$100 million” in servers to Indonesian telecom company Indosat, which “bought the servers only after securing a client with Aivres’s help, some of the people said. That customer is Shanghai-based AI startup INF Tech.” Per the WSJ, “the university had representatives during the negotiations between INF Tech and Indosat, although INF Tech was the signatory in the contract.” INF tech was reportedly founded by Qi Yuan, who heads the AI institute at Fudan University after previously serving as Chief Data Scientist of Alibaba’s Ant Group and VP of Alibaba (China) Co., Ltd.

In March 2026, the WSJ [reported](#) that Aivres would provide \$2.5 billion in Blackwell chips to Malaysian cloud operator Aolani, which would then lease the servers to ByteDance. Nvidia responded without objection, stating that, “By design, the export rules allow clouds to be built and operated outside controlled countries.”

Taken together – Speedmatrix, INF Tech, and Aolani/ByteDance – it seems to us that Aivres’ business remains, in effect, a China-dedicated supply channel.

In April 2026, Megaspeed was Dropped by Bridge Data Centers (“BDC”) – Our Source Says They Were Caught Employing “Dummy Servers”

In April 2026, Bloomberg [reported](#) that Bain Capital’s Bridge Data Centres (“BDC”) had removed Megaspeed from its Malaysian computing hub, with Bloomberg stating that BDC “didn’t cite a reason for the switch” yet “the change follows a US government probe into Megaspeed’s ownership structure and whether it smuggled advanced AI chips to China in violation of American export restrictions.”

¹³ Note trade records are marked inadvertently under both Aivres Systems Inc and Aivres System Inc.

In the opinion of one source we spoke with, however, the switch pertained to BDC's realization – in the wake of the Supermicro indictment – that Megaspeed had been installing “dummy servers” at the data center, with the real servers moving elsewhere.

*“That facility was marketed as the first hyperscale data center in Johor. **It became a place for Megaspeed to install their dummy servers.** Bridge uses cold liquid cooling which is a technical requirement for Blackwell. They've provided the space and power, but they don't actually have the eyes inside of the data centers. **Megaspeed exploited this lack of capability to divert the hardware.**”*

If true, these allegations resemble the pattern of behavior alleged in the March 2026 DoJ indictment.

Jensen Claims Total Ignorance of Any Diversion – Is He An Idiot, or Is He In On It?

We think Jensen knows exactly what is happening. Indeed, **he has been there personally every step of the way,** to the point that former Nvidia employees internally speculated that Megaspeed had some sort of special relationship with Jensen. According to one,

“Megaspeed were like specifically pretty aggressive in buying the GPU allocation. People thought they have some relationship with Jensen... Oh yeah, 100% they [Nvidia] know that these [GPUs] are not where they're supposed to be.”

One current Megaspeed employee we spoke with felt the same way, saying, “and now I work in Megaspeed and know this company also has a very close relationship with Jensen.”

Recall that in June 2024 – the same month in which Speedmatrix filed charges naming the Alibaba subsidiary – Jensen was seen partying in Taiwan with Megaspeed's Alice Huang.

One former high-level Nvidia employee told us that this was just after Megaspeed had committed to \$2 billion in GPU purchases – a timeline and scale that is corroborated by the documents laid out above.

“She was involved with 7Road, and was with Jensen at Computex [June 2024], and that was immediately after Megaspeed committed to \$2 billion in GPU purchases. And she was also actually at other public events with Jensen. And that kind of shows that she already knew the right people.”



Source: [Xueqiu, February 2025](#)

Jensen Huang was also spotted dining with Alice Huang in Taiwan in May 2025 – just a month after U.S. trade restrictions were announced. Local media provided extensive coverage of Jensen’s Taiwan visit, including footage of his visit to a local noodle shop, where he appears with Alice Huang, [Yangbin Wang](#) (CEO of Hong Kong-based Vobile, Inc.), and another unidentified woman in gray who appears to be an assistant.¹⁴



¹⁴ While we were unable to identify this woman, she has been repeatedly photographed alongside Jensen as far back as [November 2022](#).

Source: [YouTube, May 2025](#)

We find not only the timing, but the content of the video particularly interesting. The video is relatively unremarkable at first glance, yet at the 3:27 mark, several odd things happen. As Jensen’s party leaves the restaurant, Alice Huang seems to spot the reporters who had gathered outside, and stops dead in her tracks. She then appears to turn back to the woman in gray for guidance, and the woman in gray ushers her onwards. Yet while Jensen and Wang serve noodles to local fans, Huang chooses to remain in the background.



Source: [YouTube, May 2025](#)

Less than a year earlier, Alice Huang had bragged of her ability to summon Jensen on command. After export controls, however, she seemed not only reticent to approach reporters, but to be spotted with Jensen at all.

Finally – as we will describe in full in the YTL AI Cloud section below – we were told by a current Megaspeed employee that Jensen appears personally onsite to Megaspeed-linked data centers “every few months”, and that “every single time” Jensen visits, he is accompanied by Alibaba representatives.

Nvidia Has Little Ability to Claim Ignorance of its Ultimate End Users

Our conversations with numerous current and former employees at Nvidia and its OEM partners repeatedly surfaced two key insights. First, Chinese diversion has been an open secret not only in China, but at Nvidia, and second, the Company has long possessed the means to detect diversion. These means include not only initial signposts such as standard KYC checks – e.g., recently-incorporated customers suddenly placing large orders, and sales without warranties – but post-sale technical indicators. Notwithstanding the fact that Jensen appears to remain close with the Chinese, we don’t think Nvidia has any room to claim ignorance of the true drivers of its business.

“When you send the chips to Malaysia and Taiwan, you’re keeping your head in the sand and being purposefully naïve if you pretend they’re not going somewhere else... Jensen’s too smart to not know that there’s dirt there, some shady business going on.” – Former Supermicro Employee

“Those things are expensive, and you always sell with a warranty. And say you’re selling it and the customer doesn’t want a warranty, and you say well why would you not want a warranty? If there were no warranty claims, if the server went dark, I’m shocked that they were able to smuggle this much. The servers come home and they have to check for updates and Nvidia I’m sure can see that – how can all that be bypassed?... How could they not know? Large scale deployment like this, it must have been known by Nvidia... There’s also ways of pinging the server through the internet to know...” – Former Employee at Nvidia OEM Partner

“Nvidia uses gates to monitor where chips are and how they’re being used. The first is the pre-sale – where the orders don’t match the profile. So if someone suddenly orders billions, it triggers the flag. The second is the enterprise license and the software, so if 10,000 [GPUs] are supposedly in Malaysia but it never pings the Nvidia systems, then it shows those as ‘dark’ in Nvidia systems. Then the latency – if it’s supposed to be in Singapore but the latency shows it’s elsewhere, then there’s a flag.” – Former Nvidia Employee #2

“You can tell [where the GPUs are] because when we log onto the internet and do a software update, when you get the updates, you send out the patch to the chips so that it can work properly. They [Nvidia]s know based on the IP address where the chip is at. So they go back and see okay you bought 400 chips but now you’re only updating 300, so what happened to the other 100?” – Former SMCI Sales Employee #2

“Nvidia has the access to see whether the GPU is used in Malaysia or in other countries.” – Current Employee at Nvidia OEM Partner

Megaspeed’s Reach Extends to Multiple Additional Nvidia OEM Partners – Each of Which Megaspeed Has Taken Substantial Efforts to Conceal

Megaspeed and YTL AI Cloud: “Get the Supply of GPUs to the Chinese Companies”


In December 2023, Nvidia and Malaysian conglomerate YTL Corporation (4677 KL) [announced](#) a partnership for a \$4.3 billion data center in Johor, Malaysia – the 500 MW YTL Green Data Center. The facility was reportedly [completed](#) in October 2025, and houses Nvidia’s latest Grace Blackwell chips. In July 2025, Nvidia and YTL signed another \$2.36 billion agreement, which a former YTL employee told us is entirely incremental to the initial deal and will house Nvidia’s latest Vera Rubin GPUs.¹⁵

Neither YTL nor Megaspeed have publicly disclosed or discussed any relationship between them. However, a current Megaspeed employee who also previously worked for YTL told us that Megaspeed is “*one of the most important*” customers of YTL.

“Megaspeed is one of the most important customers for YTL, but we know that the end customer is Alibaba, but we don’t actually mention it up front... When I joined Megaspeed, I was surprised to notice that there are so many China staff working for Megaspeed...”


As corroboration, see that multiple Megaspeed LinkedIn profiles tout Megaspeed’s presence at YTL Green:

¹⁵ In their words, “*The first one, the \$4.3 billion, was the first deal. And then the recent is additional which would be around \$10 billion Malaysian Ringgit – that is the \$2.4 billion. The 500 MW is only the first case of the data center. There will be more than two upcoming data centers for the second part... And I can confirm that YTL is building another site to conform to that Vera Rubin platform as well.*”


 **Muhammad Aidil Nazri** (He/Him)
Responsive and Responsible

[Snow all activity](#) →



Experience

 **Data Center IT Engineer (Shift Engineer Lead)**
Speedmatrix Sdn Bhd · Full-time
Jun 2025 – Present · 11 mos
YTL Green Data Center · On-site
IT Engineer working in 12 hours shift in 24/7 rotation responsible for:


Source: [LinkedIn](#)




Akmal Hadi Mustakim He/Him
Data Center Infrastructure Engineer at YTL Johor Data Center 1 |
Testing and Commissioning | Bachelor's Degree of Computer
Engineering Technology (Hons)

 **Speedmatrix Sdn Bhd**
 **Universiti Teknikal Malaysia
Melaka**

Source: [LinkedIn](#)

 **Ji Kang Fang** (He/Him)
IDC Project Engineer | Lumileds Industrial Engineering Intern | UUM Industrial Statistics Graduate

Experience

 **IDC Project Engineer**
Speedmatrix Sdn Bhd · Full-time
Oct 2025 - Present · 7 mos
Johore, Malaysia · On-site


1. Specializing in Internet Data Center (IDC) network infrastructure delivery, supporting end-to-end project execution from planning through commissioning to final delivery.
2. Cross-functional teams coordination, managing deployment timelines, and ensuring operational readiness for critical infrastructure.
3. Hands-on in rack deployment and network implementation, including switch installation, U-position planning, equipment onboarding, and network topology planning.
4. Proactively identify and analyze risks to prevent deployment issues and improve delivery efficiency.
5. Plan and manage equipment delivery timelines to ensure smooth project flow and avoid resource conflicts or delays.

🏆 **Achievements:**

- **Delivered IDC project totalling 96MW capacity in YTL**
- More than 700 server expansion deployment in 4 IDCs

Source: [LinkedIn](#)

Megaspeed's own investor presentation also appears to use a rendering of YTL Green in describing its "Computing Cluster No. 2", according to Bloomberg reporting from December 2025.



Source: [Bloomberg](#)

We question why – if Megaspeed were truly just renting YTL's GPUs to Alibaba – the two companies are intent on keeping the relationship under wraps. To that end, a Megaspeed employee we spoke with suggested that YTL is intent on keeping the relationship private so that Megaspeed can “*get the supply of the GPUs and supply to the Chinese companies.*”

*“Right now Megaspeed still has contract with YTL. In this year YTL is supposed to construct and deliver data center for Megaspeed. Megaspeed is expanding in large scale in Malaysia. However, **Megaspeed is not using [its] name in all this...** we know that the U.S. has the restriction on chips, but **Megaspeed is able to get the supply of the GPUs and supply to the Chinese companies. They don't want the media attention so that it doesn't disrupt their business plans in the data centers.** Megaspeed is able to get the GPU from the U.S....”*


Finally, the Megaspeed employee suggested that Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang not only has full knowledge of YTL's relationship with Megaspeed and Alibaba, but has been personally involved in their interactions.

*“A representative from Alibaba would come within the same day or same week as Jensen. One would come in the morning and one in the evening. This is not once or twice; this is every single time. **I assume they meet somewhere else before coming to our venue.**”*

Megaspeed and Nvidia OEM Partner Giga Computing – Over \$500 Million in H200-Powered Servers Shipped to Megaspeed and *Another* Megaspeed Dupe, Novagate


Megaspeed has also received servers from Nvidia elite OEM compute partner, Giga Computing, a subsidiary of publicly traded Gigabyte Technology Co (2376 TW), a major Taiwanese motherboard and GPU OEM.¹⁶

¹⁶ In January 2023, Gigabyte [spun its server business](#) into a standalone entity called Giga Computing. Giga Computing remains an independent subsidiary of Gigabyte Technology, and Giga Computing's financials are fully consolidated within the Gigabyte Group.



Source: [Nvidia Partners](#)

Since December 2024, Giga has exported at least \$511 million – primarily to two entities, each of which are located in Malaysia, according to trade data.



These shipments included: \$344 million sent to Speedmatrix Sdn Bhd – Megaspeed’s Malaysian subsidiary – **of which \$312 million consisted of various Giga-branded servers containing Nvidia’s restricted H200 chips.**

Giga also shipped \$142 million to Novagate Cloud Sdn Bhd, **of which \$140 million consisted of Giga’s “G894-SD3-AAX7” servers, which contain Nvidia’s Blackwell Ultra B300 chips, and H200s.**

Exporter	Importer	Description	HS Code	Origin Country	Destination Country	Value	Date
GIGA COMPUTING TECHNK	NOVAGATE CLOUD SD	Detail SERVER G894-SD3-AAAX7	84718090	CHINA TAIWAN	MALAYSIA	17,820,626.09	Feb 26, 2026
GIGA COMPUTING TECHNK	NOVAGATE CLOUD SD	Detail SERVER G894-SD3-AAAX7	84718090	CHINA TAIWAN	MALAYSIA	17,820,615.97	Feb 26, 2026
GIGA COMPUTING TECHNK	NOVAGATE CLOUD SD	Detail SERVER G894-SD3-AAAX7	84718090	CHINA TAIWAN	MALAYSIA	17,820,610.91	Feb 27, 2026
GIGA COMPUTING TECHNK	NOVAGATE CLOUD SD	Detail SERVER G894-SD3-AAAX7	84718090	CHINA TAIWAN	MALAYSIA	16,832,202.63	Feb 20, 2026
GIGA COMPUTING TECHNK	NOVAGATE CLOUD SD	Detail SERVER G894-SD3-AAAX7	84718090	CHINA TAIWAN	MALAYSIA	16,725,886.02	Feb 23, 2026
GIGA COMPUTING TECHNK	NOVAGATE CLOUD SD	Detail SERVER G894-SD3-AAAX7	84718090	CHINA TAIWAN	MALAYSIA	16,722,522.18	Feb 23, 2026
GIGA COMPUTING TECHNK	NOVAGATE CLOUD SD	Detail SERVER G894-SD3-AAAX7	84718090	CHINA TAIWAN	MALAYSIA	16,722,429.65	Feb 23, 2026
GIGA COMPUTING TECHNK	SPEEDMATRIX SDN. BF	Detail 25FB6-H20002-N2R MODULE NVIDIA GPU H200	84715090	CHINA TAIWAN	MALAYSIA	15,093,928.32	May 13, 2025
GIGA COMPUTING TECHNK	SPEEDMATRIX SDN. BF	Detail 25FB6-H20002-N2R MODULE NVIDIA GPU H200	84715090	CHINA TAIWAN	MALAYSIA	15,093,928.32	May 13, 2025
GIGA COMPUTING TECHNK	SPEEDMATRIX SDN. BF	Detail 25FB6-H20002-N2R MODULE NVIDIA GPU H200	84715090	CHINA TAIWAN	MALAYSIA	15,093,928.32	May 13, 2025
GIGA COMPUTING TECHNK	SPEEDMATRIX SDN. BF	Detail 25FB6-H20002-N2R MODULE NVIDIA GPU H200	84715090	CHINA TAIWAN	MALAYSIA	15,093,928.32	May 13, 2025
GIGA COMPUTING TECHNK	SPEEDMATRIX SDN. BF	Detail 25FB6-H20002-N2R MODULE NVIDIA GPU H200	84715090	CHINA TAIWAN	MALAYSIA	15,093,928.32	May 13, 2025
GIGA COMPUTING TECHNK	SPEEDMATRIX SDN. BF	Detail 25FB6-H20002-N2R MODULE NVIDIA GPU H200	84715090	CHINA TAIWAN	MALAYSIA	15,093,928.32	May 13, 2025

Source: [Tradesparq](#)

In April 2024 – even prior to these shipments – Reuters [reported](#) that China may have illegally obtained Nvidia GPUs from Supermicro, Dell, and Gigabyte.

GIGABYTE
Consumer | Enterprise

Products Solutions Service/Support News Buy Resource Trending

Home > Enterprise > GPU Servers > G894-SD3-AAAX7

G894-SD3-AAAX7
HPC/AI Server - Intel® Xeon® 6 Processors - 8U DP NVIDIA HGX™ B300

AI HPC AI Training AI Inference

- ◆ NVIDIA HGX™ B300
- ◆ 8 x 800 Gb/s OSFP InfiniBand XDR or dual 400 Gb/s Ethernet GPU networking ports via onboard NVIDIA ConnectX®-8 SuperNIC™
- ◆ 1.8TB/s GPU-to-GPU bandwidth with NVIDIA NVLink™ and NVSwitch™
- ◆ Dual Intel® Xeon® 6700/6500-Series Processors
- ◆ 8-Channel DDR5 RDIMM / MRDIMM, 32 x DIMMs
- ◆ Compatible with NVIDIA® BlueField®-3 DPUs
- ◆ 2 x 10Gb/s LAN ports via Intel® X710-AT2
- ◆ 2 x M.2 slots with PCIe Gen5 x4 and x2 interface
- ◆ 8 x 2.5" Gen5 NVMe hot-swap bays

Manual Driver BIOS QVL Datasheet

Add to Quote Compare Save

Source: [Gigabyte](#)¹⁷

¹⁷ Giga [reportedly launched](#) these servers in late September 2025.

GIGABYTE Solutions for NVIDIA Blackwell GPUs: Empowering the Next Era of AI

Discover GIGABYTE's optimized solutions built to harness the groundbreaking NVIDIA Blackwell architecture. Offering unparalleled scalability, flexibility, and performance, these solutions are tailored to accelerate AI, HPC, and GPU-driven workloads, meeting the demands of tomorrow.



Source: [Giga Computing](#)





While we have already written extensively on Megaspeed, Giga's shipments to Novagate Cloud Sdn. Bhd. raise even further concerns.

Novagate Cloud Appears to Be Yet Another Megaspeed Dupe Spun Up As Investigators Circled in on Megaspeed

We believe that Novagate Cloud is yet another Megaspeed affiliate. We suspect that Novagate was deployed not only keep the China diversion pipeline humming amid mounting scrutiny into Megaspeed, but to extend it to Nvidia's most advanced Blackwell chips.

Photos of Novagate's website – which was [registered](#) in November 2025 – next to Megaspeed's website provide perhaps the most obvious evidence we could offer that Novagate and Megaspeed are affiliated.





Source: [Megaspeed](#)

Source: [Novagate](#)

Moreover, Novagate's Singapore entity, Novagate Cloud Pte Ltd., names a single shareholder, Ren Ke, a Chinese citizen. Ren Ke also serves as Director of Fortiq Pte. Ltd. and IDS Science and Technology Pte Ltd., each of which list addresses 10 Collyer Quay – Megaspeed's office building.¹⁸

Finally, Novagate's website source code also includes a scrubbed reference to Supermicro, scrubbed in the very same manner we saw in Megaspeed's website code after the Supermicro indictment.

```

193 | <div class="intro-item">
194 |   <div class="intro-item-name">Gigabyte</div>
195 |   <div class="intro-item-desc">
196 |     <a href="https://www.gigabyte.com/Enterprise" target="_blank">
197 |       
198 |     </a>
199 |   </div>
200 | </div>
201 | <!-- <div class="intro-item">
202 |   <div class="intro-item-name">supermicro</div>
203 |   <div class="intro-item-desc">
204 |     
205 |   </div>
206 | </div> -->
207 | </div>
208 | </div>

```

Source: [Novagate Partners](#)

Novagate's corporate history raises significant red flags. Its Malaysian entity – Novagate Cloud Sdn Bhd. – was formed on April 11, 2025 – a mere two days after U.S. trade restrictions were announced.

¹⁸ See Appendix 2 for full supporting documentation.


COMPANIES ACT 2016 Section 14 APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF A COMPANY	
PARTICULARS OF COMPANY	
Proposed name	NOVAGATE CONSULTING AND TRADING SDN. BHD.
Lodging Reference No	ACN041120257371317
Purpose	N - NEW INCORPORATION
Company Type	S - LIMITED BY SHARES
Sub Type	SDN. BHD.
Incorporation Date	04/11/2025
Registration No.	202501051576 (1652984-H)

Source: Malaysian Filings

On October 2, 2025, Novagate Cloud Pte Ltd was registered in Singapore with a mere \$100,000 USD in capital.¹⁹ We find the timing auspicious.

Just one week later, the [New York Times](#) and [CNBC](#) reported that U.S. and Singapore authorities were investigating Megaspeed “for allegedly helping Chinese companies evade curbs on U.S. chip exports.” Reporters added that the U.S. government was also interested in “how closely Nvidia is tracking where its A.I. chips end up...” and that Nvidia had “engaged with the U.S. government” on this issue.

Our review of trade records also reveals that in January and February 2026, Novagate not only received \$140 million in Blackwell-equipped servers, but imported another \$120 million in computing equipment and components, **overwhelmingly via Chinese suppliers.**²⁰



Source: Tradesparq

¹⁹ Per Singapore [filings](#); filings disclose registered capital increased to \$200,000 USD just days later; both Malaysia and Singapore entities were initially named Novagate Consulting and Trading.

²⁰ Wellwide’s only two export partners are Novagate Cloud Sdn Bhd and Novagate Consulting & Trading, which has itself also imported \$17.1 million in computing equipment from Wellwide. In order of magnitude, Novagate’s additional top trading partners include Ruijie Networks HK Company, Wuhan Huagong International, Ruijie Networks Co Ltd., Hisense Broadband Multimedia, Accelink Technologies Co., Ltd, Green Energy Global Investment Ltd, Chuangyi Ltd, Shenzhen SDGI Optical Network, and more.

For example, Novagate imported \$81 million in network cards, cables, and other equipment from Wellwide International Holding, based in Hong Kong. The company also imported 70,000 kg of optical fiber cables and electric conductors from mainland China supplier Shenzhen SDGI Optical Network (“SDGI”) – a state-controlled, Shenzhen-listed company that [self-identifies](#) as a military industry information provider and explicitly describes its Chengdu subsidiary’s work as contributing to “national defense” and committing to “unswervingly transform to military informatization.”

China’s Continued Reliance on Nvidia Post-Trade Restrictions is Corroborated via Third Party Data; Mainland Operators Told Us It’s An “Open Secret”

Third party data and research from multiple vectors suggests that Nvidia continued to supply China to a far more material extent than disclosed post-trade restrictions. For example,

- In April 2026, the Financial Times [reported](#) that Huawei generated \$7.5 billion in AI chip revenues in 2025. Smaller Chinese players such as Cambricon, Alibaba’s T-Head, Hygon, and Kunlun are estimated to have provided another \$4 to \$5 billion, suggesting that total Chinese supply was a mere \$12 to \$13 billion in 2025.²¹ Yet Nvidia CEO Huang and CFO Kress have each referred to China as a \$50 billion market. These figures beg the question – where did China source the other \$30 plus billion?
- Also in April 2026, Reuters [reported](#), citing data from IDC, that Nvidia “remained the market leader” in the AI accelerator market in China in 2025, “shipping around 2.2 million cards and holding a 55% share.” By contrast, Nvidia’s own disclosures suggest that the Company generated \$7.2 billion in H20 revenues, at most, in 2025, largely prior to the April 2025 restrictions.²² At \$10,000 to \$12,000 per H20, we estimate Nvidia sold a mere 720,000 cards in the year – a fraction of what IDC reports.²³

Numerous mainland Chinese operators and former employees from Chinese hyperscalers spoke to us – some, practically bragging – about the “open secret” of China’s reliance on Nvidia despite the April 2025 restrictions.

“It’s quite a common practice for Chinese companies where they are not able to buy directly, they try to procure through a third-party country... There are many companies like Supermicro. They buy GPUs [from] the third-party country, and then perhaps they falsify some documents or change the product label, and then send the product from Southeast Asia to China... Indeed many such companies.”

– Former Baidu Employee & Chinese Tech Executive

“No Chinese company is going to come out and say, ‘we’re doing this,’ but it’s an open secret. There are trading companies doing cross-border transactions in Malaysia and Singapore... There are several channels through which Chinese companies get high-end Nvidia cards.”

– Current Chinese Tech Executive

“My friends just work as dealers. My friends take in orders for the H200s and I just asked them... according to yesterday’s data it was about a 50% hike premium versus the U.S... He doesn’t have authority to buy

²¹ These figures were corroborated by various sell-side notes we reviewed.

²² In fiscal Q1 2026, Nvidia reported \$4.6 billion in H20 revenues “prior to the new export licensing requirements.” In Q2 2026, Nvidia reported \$650 million in H20 sales to “an unrestricted customer outside of China”, and in its FY 2026 Form 10-K, Nvidia disclosed \$60 million in H20 revenues under USG licenses granted in August 2025. Thus even if we assume Nvidia generated \$1.8 billion in China compute revenues from Jan 1, 2025 to Jan 25, 2025, this implies just \$7.15 billion in China H20 revenues at most for CY 2025. Sell-side analyst notes we reviewed suggested even lower figures of \$4-6 billion; we believe we are being Company-favorable here.

²³ In line with prior [reporting](#), which [suggested](#) H20 pricing of \$10,000 to \$12,000.

from Nvidia, but he has an upstream source when it comes to the Tier 1 distributors from the OEMs directly. And then he re-sells them.”

– Former Nvidia Employee now in Shenzhen

“Alibaba is a big company and doesn’t want to run afoul of U.S. sanctions. However, what they have been doing is buying ‘secondhand’ GPU cards, but they are only secondhand in terms of transactions, not necessarily meaning the usage. These are brand new cards but they went through some so-called legitimate channels to stay compliant, but the previous buyer, how they are obtaining those cards, are they through gray channels, I am not sure... I have signed an NDA so I am not comfortable telling those names [of seller channels] ... It is a known secret or an open secret that all these big companies have been buying this way. ByteDance, Tencent, Alibaba have engaged in this behavior... they all believe that if there’s fraud found later on, it’s going to be the sellers that bear the brunt of the wrath. We will not be punished by the U.S. too harshly because we’re the buyers, not the sellers.”

– Former Alibaba Employee in Mainland China

“Baidu might not be the major shareholder on paper, so on paper the buyer of those GPU cards wouldn’t be Baidu but a local buyer. But then they are still able to run their business... Out of considerations for risk management, especially for Baidu this is a NASDAQ listed company so they want to avoid the news.”

– Former Baidu Employee in Mainland China

Analysts View China as Upside – It’s Downside: China is Now Cutting Nvidia Out, and the Company Just Now Lost China for the First Time

The Street views China as an upside story. Wells Fargo, for example, [wrote](#) in March 2026 that “China could drive \$25B/annum+ in incremental revenue” and that “NVDA has previously noted that China accounted for 20-25% of total Data Center revenue.”²⁴ We think it’s the exact opposite. As Nvidia never truly left China and Beijing now clamps down on the Company in favor of domestic alternatives, China represents a massive air gap to Nvidia’s FY 2027 / CY 2026 numbers.

- On September 15, 2025, Chinese antitrust regulators published a preliminary finding that Nvidia had “discriminated unfairly against customers in the China market and therefore violated the terms of China’s approval of our Mellanox acquisition.”²⁵
- Three days later on September 18, 2025, the Cyberspace Administration of China (“CAC”) [ordered](#) major Chinese tech companies to immediately halt all purchases and testing of Nvidia’s RTX Pro 6000D.
- In October 2025, China [launched](#) nationwide customs crackdowns on Nvidia chips, with Xi Jinping reportedly calling on China to build “an independent, controllable, and collaboratively functioning AI foundational software and hardware system.”
- In November 2025, Reuters [reported](#) that China issued a directive to ban foreign AI chips from any state-funded data center, applying retroactively to projects already underway.
- In December 2025, President Trump stated that the U.S. would allow Nvidia to import H200 chips to China. Even so, White House AI czar David Sacks [stated](#) that China is “rejecting our chips... apparently they don’t want them, and I think the reason for that is they want semiconductor independence.”

²⁴ Implying \$23 to \$29 billion in FY 2025 revenues and \$39 to \$48 billion in FY 2026 revenues.

²⁵ See Nvidia’s [Form 10-K](#) filed February 25, 2026.

- In January 2026, the Financial Times [reported](#) that China had begun blocking H200 shipments at the border, leading parts suppliers to pause production.
- Just days ago on April 22, 2026, U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick [testified](#) to the Senate that China has bought zero H200 chips, noting that *“the Chinese central government has not let them as of yet buy the chips because they’re trying to keep their investment focused on their own domestic industry.”*

Our analysis of trade records throughout this report suggests to us that Beijing’s stance is hardline, and applies also to smuggling and Southeast Asian routes. For example, Aivres appears to have shipped zero chips to Megaspeed in Q1 2026, per Tradesparq data. Mainland Chinese operators said similarly, also citing Beijing’s view that key data ought to remain *within* China.

“For the overseas data centers now for Malaysia, there’s a restriction from China’s perspective that the data needs to be retained within the territory. So now it is not possible to use an overseas data center for the demand from China’s side.” – Former Tencent Executive

“If we look at the market [share] going from 90% to 55% and if it goes to zero, it will be a huge blow to Nvidia financially. R&D impact as well. But I think the impact more than that, for Jensen, is long term it will create an ecosystem of fragmentation and will create global competitors.” – Former Nvidia Employee in Shenzhen

“As you will see this year there is very few orders in China... Nvidia market share in China will decline this year. That’s why Jensen Huang was in panic mode and went to China and all that.” – Chinese Tech Executive

If that weren’t enough, from the U.S. side, on March 23, 2026 – following the Supermicro DoJ indictment – Democratic Senators Jim Banks (R-IN) and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) [wrote to](#) Commerce Secretary Lutnick requesting *“immediate action”* including *“the immediate pausing”* of all export licenses for Nvidia chips meant for China **and Southeast Asia intermediaries.**

We believe Nvidia is now *actually* losing the business that Jensen claimed the Company lost a year ago. We think this helps explain Jensen’s recent hair-trigger behavior on the Dwarkesh Patel podcast, especially around Chinese export controls. We believe there’s a massive air gap in Nvidia’s forward numbers. We are short and believe shares are headed lower.

Appendix 1: History of OBON Corp and Problematic CP Group Associations

In May 2017, IWEB executed a reverse merger with Enigma Technology International Corporation (“Enigma BVI”), which filings disclose was owned by Ratanaphon Wongnapachant, as well as Ms. Chanikarn Lertchawalitanon and S-Mark Co. Ltd. After the merger, Wongnapachant took over as CEO of IWEB and [owned](#) 48% of the company.

In 2018, IWEB [created](#) a series of shells, including OBON Corporation Company Limited (“OBON Thailand”), Marvelous Era Limited (BVI), One Belt One Network Holdings Limited (“OBON BVI”), and One Belt One Network (HK) Limited in Hong Kong.²⁶ In its 2019 annual report, IWEB stated that, “*OBON Thailand leases and installs network systems, WiFi devices and related accessories for CatBuzz TV (“CAT”) and provides maintenance services.*” IWEB’s [filings](#) through April 2020 stated that, “*These companies currently have minimal operations.*” For the full-year 2020, IWEB filings disclose OBON Thailand generated revenues of just five-thousand USD.

In June 2021, IWEB sold its 70% stake in OBON BVI to Panas Jirawattananunt for \$20,000 USD, and began reporting OBON as a discontinued operation. One month later, IWEB acquired Tingo Mobile Plc., and Wongnapachant [resigned](#) as CEO of IWEB.²⁷

OBON never appears to have generated much meaningful business, however, until its 2024 data center partnerships with OneAsia and True IDC.²⁸

In May 2024, OBON [formed](#) a strategic collaboration with OneAsia, which called itself a leading data center operation in Asia. According to the press release, “*with the deployment of NVIDIA H100 servers, this collaboration will empower OBON to launch Siam AI Cloud and revolutionize the country's AI roadmap.*” The press release also directs readers to visit www.siam.ai to find more information about OBON Corporation.

About OBON Corporation

OBON Corporation, a Thai company headquartered in Bangkok, Thailand, stands as an innovative AI enterprise leading the charge in cutting-edge technology. By harnessing the power of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and data analytics, we craft intelligent solutions that revolutionize various industries. Our team of experts meticulously designs custom AI algorithms, predictive models, and automation tools, all aimed at enhancing decision-making, streamlining processes, and fueling business growth. Whether it’s natural language processing, computer vision, or recommendation systems, we remain steadfast in pushing the boundaries of what AI can achieve. For more information, please visit www.siam.ai


Source: [OneAsia Press Release](#)

²⁶ Note the similarity in naming convention to the CCP’s infamous “One Belt One Road” initiative. Also note in June 2019, OBON BVI, OBON Thailand, and OBON Thailand shareholders [entered](#) into VIE agreements giving OBON BVI “*contractual rights to control and operate*” OBON Thailand.

²⁷ In June 2023, Hindenburg Research [alleged](#) that Tingo (NASDAQ:TIO) was “*an exceptionally obvious scam with completely fabricated financials.*” In November 2023, the SEC halted trading in Tingo shares, and in December 2023, the SEC announced charges against Tingo. In January 2024, the DoJ followed on with [charges](#) of its own, and in September 2024, a U.S. federal court ordered a [final judgement](#) of \$250 million against Tingo and its former CEO Dozy Mmubuosi.

²⁸ Prior to IWEB selling OBON in June 2021 for just \$20,000 USD, OBON was described in IWEB filings as in the business of leasing and installing network systems, WiFi devices, and “CatBuzz TV” accessories, yet having “*minimal operations.*” In 2022, OBON Thailand was mentioned in East Stone Acquisition Corp [proxy statements](#) as having had preliminary discussions and plans to collaborate, “*to develop V2X autonomous driving solutions in Thailand using the 5G technology provided by OBON.*” Then through year-end 2023, Thai [corporate filings](#) reveal OBON remained a relatively small operation, with total income (revenues) of ~\$900,000 USD. See Appendix 1 for further details.

Siam [was reportedly Nvidia's first](#), and remains its only listed cloud compute partner in Thailand, according to Nvidia's partner directory.



Source: [Nvidia Partners](#)

In October 2024, Siam AI [incorporated](#) a Singapore entity, Siam AI Corporation Pte. Ltd. Its filings disclose officers including Luan Jingwei, Chew Kah Leong, Ratanaphon Wongnapachant, and Hing Shun Thomas Tsang. Singapore filings also disclose the appointment of Safura Binte Sa'ad as secretary in September 2025.²⁹

Siam AI officer Hing Shun Thomas Tsang is the son of Donald Tsang – the former Chief Executive of Hong Kong.

In response to Bloomberg's reporting days ago, Siam AI CEO Ratanaphon claimed that he is no longer involved at OBON. However, OBON's Hong Kong affiliate – One Belt One Network Holdings Limited – also names Hing Shun Thomas Tsang as a director, while the father of Siam AI CEO Ratanaphon Wongnapachant, Weerachai Wongnapachant, is also listed as a shareholder of OBON Thailand.

²⁹ Safura Binte Sa'ad replaced "[Chew Shin Yee](#)" as secretary, per the filing made on September 24, 2025. Sa'ad is a [corporate secretary](#) at HeySara and previously in the same role at VentureHaven, each of which are Singaporean corporate services providers. Per Singapore law, businesses must hold at least one citizen or permanent resident as authorized representative, leading many businesses with otherwise foreign representatives to engage firms like HeySara to provide a "secretary for hire" – a model that has come under scrutiny. In particular, in August 2023, Singapore authorities arrested 10 Chinese-origin suspects known as the "Fijian Gang" in Singapore's largest ever money laundering case, seizing more than \$2.8 billion SGD in assets. One of the firms linked to Zhang Ruijin – one of the 10 individuals accused – [utilized Safura Binte Sa'ad](#) as corporate secretary. Sa'ad was mentioned as holding a similar position at over 3,500 firms.

No.	English Name	Chinese Name	Address			Class of Share
1	ONE BELT ONE NETWORK HOLDINGS LIMITED	-	WICKHAMS CAY 2, ROAD TOWN, TORTOLA, VG1110, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS			Ordinary

List of Directors

Director

No.	Name in English	Name in Chinese	HKID No. / BRN	Passport No.	Passport Issuing Country / Region	Director Type	Onl
1	TSANG, HING SHUN THOMAS	曾慶淳	K929***	-	-	Natural Person	
2	WAI, HOK FUNG	衛鶴峰	V031***	-	-	Natural Person	
3	WONG, C CHING	黃司政	Z022***	-	-	Natural Person	

Source: Hong Kong Filings

In December 2024, Siam [signed an MOU](#) with True IDC to reportedly, “establish Thailand as the Regional AI data center hub.” True DC is [characterized](#) as “Thailand’s leading data center and cloud service provider” and is a subsidiary of Thai conglomerate Charoen Pokphand Group (“CP Group”).

For decades, the CP Group has been entwined with the CCP, to the point that it may as well serve as an extension of it – and indeed has been recognized by the CCP for its contributions to CCP initiatives. By way of a non-exhaustive list:

- In 1979, Dhanin Chearavanont and the CP Group [obtained](#) Shenzhen foreign business license No. 0001, making CP the first foreign multinational to invest in post-Mao China. This status is still honored by Beijing’s references to CP as “001” still to this day.
- In 2008, Dhanin was [elected](#) the inaugural president of the China Overseas Chinese Investment Enterprises Association – a CCP-coordinated diaspora business body. He held the post for four consecutive terms.
- In 2012, CP [purchased](#) HSBC’s 15.6% stake in Ping An Insurance, with China’s state-run development bank financing the deal.
- In October 2019, CP led a consortium to build a high-speed rail in Thailand, backed by China Railway Construction Corp. Chinese officials [referred](#) to the project as a key “Belt and Road” initiative.
- In November 2020, U.S. Congressman Mike Gallagher [wrote](#) to Education Secretary Betsy DeVos, detailing the CP Group’s “significant ties to the Chinese Communist Party international influence apparatus”, describing CP Chairman Cheravanont – pictured with Jensen above – as “one of the CCP’s oldest and most important friends in the diaspora.”
- In November 2025, Dhanin [visited](#) Hainan around Xi Jinping’s tour, met with local party officials and business people, and stated that, “it is necessary to cooperate with top Chinese enterprises to bring the most successful and advanced practices overseas, especially to Southeast Asia and other Belt and Road countries...”

Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang was in attendance at these December 2024 meetings alongside CP Group senior officials and Siam AI CEO Ratanaphon Wongnapachant. According to [the Bangkok Post](#), Ratanaphon’s uncle – former Thailand PM Thaksin Shinawatra – also attended.



Source: [True IDC](#), [DigiTimes Asia](#)

One month later, Siam AI began [touting](#) its access to Nvidia’s Blackwell B200 chips, “the first business operator in ASEAN to receive delivery” of such chips.

Appendix 2: Ren Ke Directorships

Number of shares	Issued share capital
100,000	USD 100,000.00
Paid-up share capital	
USD 100,000.00	

Individual share allotment ¹

1. REN KE - PA7230114
 Shareholder
 REN KE -PA7230114

Source: *Singapore Filings*

202448172M
FORTIQ PTE. LTD.
23 NOV 2024
EXEMPT PRIVATE COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES
LIVE COMPANY
23 NOV 2024
10 COLLYER QUAY, #40-00, OCEAN FINANCIAL CENTRE, SINGAPORE 049315

202326749E
IDS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PTE. LTD.
07 JUL 2023
EXEMPT PRIVATE COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES
LIVE COMPANY
07 JUL 2023
10 COLLYER QUAY, #40-00, OCEAN FINANCIAL CENTRE, SINGAPORE 049315

Name of Company	:	MEGASPEED INTERNATIONAL PTE. LTD.
Former Name if any	:	7ROAD INTERNATIONAL PTE. LTD.
Date of Change of Name	:	07 MAR 2023
UEN	:	201535940Z
Incorporation Date	:	28 SEP 2015
Company Type	:	PRIVATE COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES
Status of Company	:	LIVE COMPANY
Status Date	:	28 SEP 2015
Registered Office Address	:	10 COLLYER QUAY, #07-02, OCEAN FINANCIAL CENTRE, SINGAPORE 049315
Date of Address	:	01 JUL 2024
Date of Last AGM	:	30 JUN 2025
Date of Last AR	:	14 JAN 2026
FYE As At Date of Last AR	:	31 DEC 2024

Source: Singapore Filings